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TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
T HE purpose of this survey is to present the various modifica-
tions, interpretations, and trends that were evidenced in Texas
Civil Procedure within the past year. This survey shall deal with
amendments to the Rules of Texas Civil Procedure and with the
case law decided by the Texas Supreme Court. It should be pointed
out that the new amendments to the Rules1 shall only be briefly
commented upon, for this facet of the law has been recently dealt
with fully by Mr. Wilmer D. Masterson, Jr., Professor of Law,
Southern Methodist University.' Herein, the case law will be
stressed and the most important decisions shall be noted.
PART I. RULE CHANGES
These amendments became effective January 1, 1955.
RULE 86: PLEA OF PRIVILEGE
The amendment to this rule provides for service of the plea of
privilege on the plaintiff or his attorney of record by actual de-
livery or by registered mail. The amendment does not specifically
make the service on the plaintiff or his attorney jurisdictional so
that a court would have no power to act upon the plea until notice
had been given to the plaintiff or waived. It is believed that service
will be held to be jurisdictional.8
RULE 329 (b): TIMES FOR FILING AND DISPOSING OF
MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
This new rule does away with the difference between the times
for filing and disposing of motions and amended motions for new
trial under the General Practice Act and those applicable under
the Special Practice Act. The times applicable to these motions
under the Special Practice Act are now applicable in all district
courts of the State by virtue of Rule 329 (b), except with refer-
1 References hereinafter made to various "Rules" will be understood as relating to
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 Texas Court Rule Amendments which Will Become Effective January 1, 1955, 8
Sw.L.J. 377.
8 Id. at p. 378.
4The Special Practice Act in Texas, 6 Sw.L.J. 193.
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ence to the matter of presenting the motion. It is important to
note, however, that Rule 329 (b) applies only to times for filing
motions and amended motions for new trial. It is still essential to
determine if the district court is under the Special or the General
Practice Act because under the General Practice Act a suit which
is being tried when the term of court runs out will be rendered a
nullity unless the term of court is extended.
A bill now before the legislature will, if passed, provide for
continuous terms in all district courts for all purposes. If it is not
passed, then the term times of courts under the General Practice
Act still must be extended to preserve a suit in progress.
PART II: CASE LAW
APPEAL
A recent decision illustrates the inclination from technicality to
practicality in procedure and an exception to the rule that reversal
on appeal by one party does not justify reversal in favor of non-
appealing parties.5
An interstate carrier sued other interstate carriers alleging that
they had conspired to suspend their deliveries to and from the
complaining carrier because of alleged coercion by a labor union.
The labor union intervened and appealed when the trial court
granted the injunction, but the defending carriers did not appeal.
The Supreme Court decided that there had been no coercion by
the union and that the injunction would be set aside not only as
to the union, but also as to the carriers who had not appealed. The
rule that reversal upon appeal by a party does not justify reversal
in favor of non-appealing parties is not invariable. To leave the
injunction in effect against the non-appealing parties would be to
ignore substance in deference to form.
IRREGULAR COMMUNICATION TO JURY
Rules 285 and 286 provide that the jury may communicate
with the trial judge only in prescribed ways. However, the Su-
5 Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local No. 941 v. Whitfield
Transportation, Inc ........ Tex -------- 273 S.W. 2d 857 (1954).
(Vol. 9
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preme Court recently held that a communication to a juror in an
unprescribed way did not require a reversal in the absence of a
showing of probable harm.6 The Court stated that Rule 434, the
harmless error rule, was to be applied in this case and that the
communication did not (reasonably) cause harm. It added that
Rules 434, 503, 327, and 1 were to be construed in the light
of the objectives of the new rules as stated in Rule I and that this
communication was harmless error.
The Court in this decision expressly rejects the authority and
holding of the Court of Civil Appeals.' The position of the peti-
tioner and Court of Civil Appeals was that a person seeking a
new trial on the ground of irregular communication with the jury
would have to show probable harm if such communication was
between counsel and juror, but would not have to show probable
harm if the communication was between judge and juror. There
is no ground for the distinction and the cases holding that com-
munication between judge and juror requires an automatic rever-
sal are overruled. Note that the Court also applies Rule 434 and
503 in conjunction with Rule 327 which applies expressly to
irregular communications with juries.
MASTER IN CHANCERY
Rule 171 was taken in part from repealed Article 2320 and
in part from Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure!
The Supreme Court held in construing Rule 171 that since the
second paragraph was taken verbatim from Federal Rule 53, it
is presumed that it was adopted in the light of decisions con-
struing it. Therefore, a Master appointed by a Travis County
District Court in a receivership hearing to take testimony in Bexar
County had the authority to exercise subpoena powers and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses so long as such action did not
require the witnesses to leave the county of their residence and
appear in the county where the cause was pending. Where a wit-
ness refused to appear before the Master, he could be held in
contempt of court. 9
6 Ross v. Texas Employers' Ins. Assn'., -- Tex._, 267 S.W. 2d 541 (1954).
7 Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n. v. Ross, .-- Tex.--, 267 S.W. 2d 547 (1954).
8 28 U.S.C.A.
9 Ex parte L. H. Odem, .--- Tex ...... ,271 S.W. 2d 796 (1954).
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PARTIES AND SEVERABILITY OF CAUSES
The Supreme Court, under Rule 503, established that a minor's
suit for personal injuries brought by a next friend could be severed
from a suit for medical expenses by the next friend, in whose
custody the minor had been for a time.' In the trial court, the
lawyers and the next friend filed a motion for judgment on the
verdict of the jury that the child take nothing and that the next
friend recover medical expenses. The court overruled the motion
and denied recovery in both actions. The Supreme Court reversed
the decision in the personal injury suit because the jury found
contrary to the evidence. However, it severed the cause for medical
expenses and affirmed the judgment of the trial court that the next
friend should take nothing because he was guilty of contributory
negligence. The Court held that the lawyers could not waive the
child's rights or acquiesce in the jury finding that the child take
nothing under these circumstances. This case is a graphic illustra-
tion of the very dominant principle in Texas law to the effect that
all persons are guardians of minors and incompetents.
SUMMARY JUDGMENTS
In a case that establishes the rule in Texas in accord with fed-
eral holdings, the Supreme Court stated that each motion for sum-
mary judgment must stand or fall on its own merits and the grant-
ing of the motion does not depend upon one party's failure to
sustain the burden of proof." When both parties move for a
summary judgment, the burden is upon each to prove clearly his
right thereto, and neither party can prevail because of the failure
of the other to discharge his burden. The federal law on the
subject requires that to be entitled to summary judgment, each
person must meet the "slightest doubt" test, i.e., a litigant has a
right to a trial where there is the slightest doubt as to the facts
and a denial of that right is reviewable. The court is not bound
to grant a summary judgment merely because one has been re-
quested. 2
10 Lowery v. Berry, -- Tex.---, 269 S.W. 2d 795 (1954).
11 Tigner v. First National Bank of Angleton, -- Tex.---, 264 S.W. 2d 85 (1954).
12 Steinberg v. Adams, 90 F. Supp. 604 (S. D. N.Y. 1950) ; Walling v. Richmond
Screw Anchor Co., 154 F. 2d 780 (2d Cir. 1946).
[Vol. 9
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SPECIAL ISSUES
In the field of special issues, which consistently offers many
detailed problems, any decision by the Supreme Court is of im-
port. However, space allows only a brief treatment of the most
consequential decisions within the past year.
An interpretation of a portion of Rule 279 was handed down
by the Court.'" A petitioner contended that since the only ground
of liability submitted to the jury was not supported by the evi-
dence judgment should therefore be rendered that the respondent
take nothing. The petitioner based his request upon the theory that
since the respondent did not request the submission of a special
issue on any other ground of liability, he thereby waived his
right of recovery upon any other ground under Rule 279. The
Supreme Court stated that Rule 279 was one of procedure only,
and waiver under the rule pertains only to the particular trial
involved in the appeal. The respondent on remand of the cause
can raise new issues not permissible under Rule 279 in this
appeal.'
Perhaps the most significant case in this area depicted the
necessity for the plaintiff to specially except to a general pleading
of affirmative defenses. 5 In this case an exception would have
avoided a reversal. In the cause, the defendant pleaded contribu-
tory negligence only generally, and such pleading was not ex-
cepted to by the plaintiff. Evidence of specific acts of contribu-
tory negligence came in during the trial. The court in its tentative
charge submitted the issue of contributory negligence in the gen-
eral language of the defendant's answer. The defendant did not
object to this, but he did request specific submissions of contribu-
tory negligence which were refused by the court, and this, the
defendant charged as error. The Supreme Court agreed with the
defendant's contention and held that a general pleading of con-
tributory negligence would support either general submissions
13 Rule 279--"Upon appeal all independent grounds of recovery * * not conclu-
sively established under the evidence and upon which no issue is given or requested
shall be deemed as waived * * *"
14 Hicks v. Matthews, -----Tex...., 266 S.W. 2d 846 (1954).
15 Agnew v. Coleman County Electric Cooperative, _-Tex.., 272 S.W. 2d 877
(1954).
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of the defense or submissions in such groups of issues as may be
made by the evidence if the defendant requested them. The fact
that the trial court had a general submission in its tentative charge
did not deprive the defendant of the right to his specific submis-
sion. It was therefore error to refuse the specific issues requested.
If in fact both the general submission of the court and the specific
submission requested by the defendant had been given, the plain-
tiff would have had to object to this double submission before
the charge went to the jury or he would have waived the error.
But, the defendant did not waive his rights to the specific submis-
sion by failing to object to the general submission. The Court held
that his request for the specific issues was sufficient to inform the
court that he did not want the general submission given by the
court.
A strong dissent by Justice Smith states that the mere request
for the defendant's own specific issues is not sufficient to inform
the court of the defendant's objection to the court's general sub-
mission. Therefore, when the defense has been submitted fairly,
as in this case, in a general form, the defendant cannot complain
that he has suffered any harmful error by reason of the fact that
his request for a specific issue was refused.
The plaintiff could have avoided this situtaion by special ex-
ceptions to the defendant's general answer in the outset.
In another decision, the Court, in applying the harmless error
rule, stated that the respondent's contention that the special issue
was an implied comment on the evidence was far from fanciful,
but yet was too theoretical to justify a reversal. 6 "Especially in
an already complicated field like that of special issues, we cannot
strain too hard for perfection without damage to the whole jury
system in civil cases."' 7
The statement of this belief by the Supreme Court illustrates
the modern approach to all phases of procedure, and it is within
the spirit in which the New Rules were adopted. The court seeks
continually to broaden the application of the harmless error rule,
11 Mason v. Yellow Cab and Baggage Co., -- Tex.-., 269 S.W. 2d 329 (1954).
17 Ibid.
[Vol. 9
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and to reach a practical result. The emphasis clearly is upon the
de.emphasis of form and technicality.
Frank W. Rose.
